Operation Banner: the British Army
in Northern Ireland
(As buildings burn, British Army troops patrol the streets after being deployed to end the Battle of the Bogside in Derry/Londonderry on August 15, 1969.)
Operation
Banner was the deployment of British soldiers in Northern Ireland. This action
was considered as early as 1966 when violence erupted between the newly formed
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and armed Republicans. There was also talk of
introducing the military in late 1968, as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
and ‘B-Specials’ struggled to contain civil rights protests and the sectarian
violence that followed. The British government and British army commanders
were, by all accounts, reluctant to put troops on the ground in Northern
Ireland. Two Northern Ireland prime ministers, Terence O’Neill and James
Chichester-Clark, also resisted the urge to request military assistance; to do
so would be a sign their governments had lost control of the situation. But
when rioting, violence and gun fighting erupted in the Bogside area of Derry in
August 1969, then spread to other locations in Northern Ireland, it stretched
the RUC dangerously thin. Left with no alternative, Chichester-Clark petitioned
London to send in troops. This request was made on August 14th and noted in
British cabinet records:
“The Cabinet
Security Committee authorised a formal request for the use of troops in aid of
the civil power in Londonderry at 4.45pm, in view of the latest police reports
indicating their inability to cope with a rapidly deteriorating situation.”
A period of
hope
(A British soldier lets a young boy look through the sights of his rife in Belfast on May 13, 1981.)
The arrival of
British troops was welcomed by many Catholics, at least initially. Residents in
Derry, Belfast and other troubled areas believed that British soldiers would
act with greater caution and neutrality than RUC officers or the thuggish ‘B
Specials’. Some Catholics even cheered and applauded British soldiers, or
offered them cups of tea. Other developments also inspired hope. On August 28th
1969 a British lieutenant general, Ian Freeland, took charge of security
matters, removing these powers from Stormont and the RUC. British Home
Secretary James Callaghan twice visited Belfast to meet with government
representatives. On his first visit in late August Callaghan issued a
communique, promising to oversee sweeping reforms and protections for civil
rights. In September the British Army began erecting the first ‘peace line’, a
high wall separating Catholic and Protestant areas in Belfast. The Cameron
Report on disorders in Northern Ireland in late 1968 and early 1969 was also
published in September. This report vindicated the Catholic community’s
complaints about discrimination and police heavy-handedness, finding examples
of “unnecessary and ill-controlled force in the dispersal of the
demonstrators”. There was also a separate inquiry, overseen by Baron Hunt, into
the structure and organisation of Northern Ireland’s civilian police service.
In October 1969
the Hunt Report made a series of recommendations on security and policing. Hunt
recommended the dissolution of the ‘B Specials’, a suggestion that was passed
into law and finalised in March 1970. A replacement force, the Ulster Defence
Regiment (UDR), was formed on January 1st 1970 and began operations three
months later. The UDR was a reservist security force but was intended to be
well trained and non-sectarian. Hunt recommended the UDR recruit Protestants
and Catholics in similar proportions – but the regiment failed to attract and
retain sufficient numbers of Catholics. In the regiment’s first year only 18
per cent of its rank and file were Catholic; the vast majority of its first
recruits were Protestant and a good number of these (more than 1,400) were
former ‘B Specials’. There were attempts to integrate Catholics into the UDR
but the regiment was dominated by Protestants. As a consequence, it was
dominated by Unionist culture and political values. Some Catholics in the UDR
reported both open and subtle intimidation by Protestants. Others were
discouraged by actions such as the Falls curfew, internment and Bloody Sunday,
which convinced many that security forces were targeting Catholics. By 1972,
most viewed the UDR as a bulwark of Protestantism and Loyalism. Disillusioned
Catholics abandoned the UDR and by 1975 fewer than four per cent of its members
were Catholic.
The
relationship deteriorates
(A British soldier trains his rifle on a suspect in the Republican Ballymurphy estate in West Belfast on April 12, 1972.)
The honeymoon
between Northern Ireland’s civilian population and the British military lasted
but a few weeks. The Army’s attempts to win over Catholic communities were
undermined by its responses to civil disorder, which tended to be militaristic
and heavy-handed. In April 1970 violence erupted in Ballymurphy, a desperately
poor housing estate in western Belfast, after an Orange Order parade passed
close to the fringes of the estate. Catholic youths clashed with Loyalists and
a British company was sent into Balllymurphy to quell the violence. When the
soldiers themselves were pelted with stones, they responded by firing canisters
of CS gas. This gas flooded the estate and affected thousands of residents not
involved in the rioting. According to British journalist Simon Winchester, the
use of tear gas at Ballymurphy “welded the crowd together in common sympathy
and a common hatred for the men who gassed them”. In July 1970 the Army,
frustrated by rising gun violence, swept into the Lower Falls, a Catholic
stronghold in west Belfast. Soldiers locked down an area of 50 streets, imposed
a curfew and launched a house-to-house search for weapons. Tipped off earlier,
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had cleared the area of arms and personnel so
the soldiers found little. The searches triggered clashes between residents and
soldiers, as well as some violence. Five people were shot dead while others
were injured by gunfire or CS gas. The Army’s image as peacekeeper and
protector of Catholic civilians was significantly damaged. It should be noted that many Catholics
opposed British military intervention from the outset. Moderate Nationalists
objected to Operation Banner because it militarised their society and exposed
their children to troops on a regular basis. They condemned it as a flawed
solution, a foreign military response to an Irish civil problem. Republicans,
of course, opposed any form of British presence in Northern Ireland, whether
political or military. They viewed the British Army as a foreign imperialist
force, deployed to enforce British sovereignty and prop up the floundering
Stormont government. A militant faction of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
began calling for an all-out war against British soldiers, a tactic rejected by
the IRA’s mainstream leaders. In late 1969 these radicals split from the
‘official’ IRA, later becoming known as the Provisional IRA. Through 1970 the
Provisional IRA recruited members, attacked the “British occupation” with
rhetoric and propaganda and sought to win support from Catholic civilians.
Young IRA volunteers also provoked civil unrest and violence, such as the April
1970 Ballymurphy riots. Their tactic was to trigger a disproportionate military
response from the British; this would poison civilian attitudes towards the
British Army and drive Catholics towards the IRA. The Provisional IRA stopped
short of killing British soldiers, however. As Sinn Fein leader Danny Morrison
noted, it was too early for such a tactic: “They couldn’t have sold it”.
The Provisional
IRA declares war
By the
beginning of 1971, the Provisional IRA was ready to declare war on the British
Army in Northern Ireland. Its first victim was Robert Curtis, a 20-year-old
soldier. Curtis was gunned down by a sniper on February 6th, while on foot
patrol on New Lodge Road. Before the month was out the ‘Provos’ had killed
another British soldier, two RUC officers and five civilians working for the
BBC. These events triggered the resignation of prime minister James
Chichester-Clark in March 1971; he was replaced by Brian Faulkner. The new
prime minister made some attempt at reconciliation, promoting a non-Unionist to
his cabinet, appointing a Catholic as minister of state and offering
Nationalists key roles in government committees. Most of Faulkner’s attention
was on security, however, and the increasing volume and ferocity of
paramilitary violence from the Provisional IRA. The British Army’s image was
finally shattered in January 1972, when British paratroopers opened fire on a
protest in Derry, killing 14 people. The first investigation into ‘Bloody
Sunday’ was corrupt and inept in equal measure; the Army refused to admit fault
and was not held to account for the actions of its members. ‘Bloody Sunday’
only widened the gulf between British security forces and Catholic civilians.
Eighteen months into Operation Banner, British soldiers were enmeshed in a
hornet’s nest of sectarian hatred and deadly paramilitary warfare, with no
possibility of victory and no clear avenue for withdrawal. The worst, however,
was yet to come.
(A British Army solider stands in front of a burning barricade in Belfast on August 1, 1976.)
1. Operation
Banner was the deployment of British Army soldiers in Northern Ireland, to
assist local police and help keep the peace. This operation began on August
14th 1969.
2. Operation
Banner was intended to be temporary. British strategists hoped to restore order
by winning the trust of Catholics while reforming Northern Ireland’s security
measures.
3. One reform
was the abolition of the ‘B Specials’ and the formation of the UDR. The UDR was
intended to be non-sectarian but like the RUC came to be dominated by
Protestants.
4. The Army’s
tactical response to the Ballymurphy riots, the Falls curfew and ‘Bloody
Sunday’ all alienated Catholics, who felt they were being targeted and
persecuted.
5. The presence
of British soldiers in Northern Ireland also produced a split in the IRA. One
faction determined to take stronger action against the soldiers evolved into
the Provisional IRA.
https://alphahistory.com/northernireland/operation-banner/
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