From the DW:
“How could
Taiwan defend itself against China?”
Threatened by
one of the world's biggest armies, Taiwan's strategy is to make an invasion as
difficult as possible. Tensions between Beijing and Washington are rising over
Taiwan, as United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrived on the
self-governing island on Tuesday. Pelosi, the highest US official after US
President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, has fiercely criticized
China for decades, while ardently supporting Beijing's opposition including the
Tiananmen Square protesters, Tibetan Buddhist leader the Dalai Lama, and Hong
Kong pro-democracy activists. Pelosi's visit to Taiwan has angered the Chinese
authorities, who have recently ramped up their aggressive patrolling and
overflights of Taiwan's air defense zone while conducting frequent military
drills.
Will the US
defend Taiwan against China? It is not clear to what extent Taiwan could
rely on US support in case of Chinese aggression. For decades, Washington has
maintained "strategic ambiguity" about Taiwan, officially known as
the Republic of China (ROC), keeping up a friendly relationship with its
government without formal diplomatic relations or even recognition as a fully
sovereign state. The White House has been selling defensive military equipment
to Taiwan; however, it has not officially committed itself to military
intervention. Meanwhile, China
sees the island as its territory and has been developing plans to take it back,
by force if necessary. Over past decades, the Chinese Communist party
has been preparing its military wing, known as The People's Liberation Army
(PLA). The PLA dwarfs Taiwanese forces and, according to some experts, is more
powerful than the forces any of Taiwan's supporters, such as the US or Japan,
could afford to bring to the region. But that doesn't mean Taipei is completely
helpless against a possible PLA attack.
Porcupine
strategy: A large number of small things
(Taiwan has
heavily invested in a large number of low-cost portable missiles)
The potential
risk of Chinese invasion has hung over Taiwan for decades, long enough for it
to develop a sophisticated defense system suited to its geography. To deal with a gigantic power like China,
Taiwan has adopted an asymmetrical warfare method known as the "porcupine
strategy," which aims to make the invasion very difficult and costly for
the enemy. Taiwan has stacked up large
inventories of anti-air, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons and ammunition. That
includes unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and low-cost munitions like mobile
coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), which have the capacity to destroy
China's expensive naval vessels and naval equipment. Stealth fast-attack crafts
and miniature missile assault boats are other relatively cheap but highly
effective equipment. They can be dispersed among fishing boats across Taiwan's
ports. Sea mines and fast mine-laying ships could also complicate the landing
operations of any invading navy.
A
multilayered sea defense
(Taiwanese
forces aim to hamper PLA's advance in the sea before landing)
To swiftly
take the Island, China's PLA would need to transport many soldiers and great
quantities of supplies — armored vehicles, weapons, ammunition, food, medical
supplies and fuel — across the strait. This is only possible by sea, since
airlifts and fleets of planes have limited capacity. ROC's territory includes a
chain of Islands, some of them near Chinese shores. Monitoring equipment
installed on those islands can detect the first fleet departing from China's
coasts. That is supposed to give the Taiwanese forces enough time to coordinate
a multilayered defense. Sea mines, combined with fast-attack craft and missile
assault boats, along with land-based munitions positioned on shores and nearby
islands, would face the PLA in its most vulnerable state, before it gets a
chance to land and start an operation.
Guerrilla
warfare Taiwan has also prepared its cities for guerrilla warfare in case
the PLA succeeds in getting boots on the ground. Man-portable air-defense
systems (MANPADS) and mobile anti-armor weapons, such as high mobility
artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), can be used in urban fights, while buildings
can be turned into barracks. According to a 2017 report published by the RAND
foundation, there are 2.5 million men in the military reserve system plus 1
million civil defense volunteers. In total, that number accounts for about 15%
of Taiwan's population and one man out of every four.
Defending
the defense system
(Taiwan's new
advanced jet trainer aircraft parked at an air force base)
One of the
main goals of Taiwan's tactics is to protect the principal defense systems,
including aircraft and anti-ballistic defense systems, which can intercept
ballistic rockets and inflict primary damage on invading powers. In the last
couple of years, Taiwan has purchased dozens of advanced fighter jets from the
US, while manufacturing its own AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo, dubbed the Indigenous
Defense Fighter. Many aircraft are being held in fortified bases, with the
pilots being trained to use highways to land if airports are bombed.
In addition,
even though Washington might not get involved if a conflict happens, it has
vowed to continue selling defense systems and provide intelligence support to
Taiwan. All these measures would help Taiwan send a message to China that if a
war breaks out, it would be lengthy, costly and bloody. However, for a small defender like the ROC,
the best scenario would be for the conflict to never happen.
^ The US and
the World needs to do everything we can to help Taiwan against China the same way
we need to help Ukraine against Russia. ^
https://www.dw.com/en/how-could-taiwan-defend-itself-against-china/a-62669521
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