From the MT:
“Foreign Policy Experts Map
Russia's Plans for 2022”
Russian foreign policy is likely
to continue to dominate global news headlines this year after a tense 2021. Russia’s military build-up on the Ukrainian
border has set the world on edge, raising fears of an invasion. In neighboring Belarus, the Kremlin has moved
closer to fully-fledged integration with the country, whose embattled strongman
President Alexander Lukashenko looks increasingly isolated from the West. Looking
west, the jailing of Kremlin-critic Alexei Navalny further strained relations
with Europe, while across the Atlantic, the election of Joe Biden fundamentally
changed the course of American foreign policy toward Russia. Russia also tried
to extend its global footprint, by cooperating with post-coup Myanmar and
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. And as
the world continued to struggle with the coronavirus pandemic, Russia attempted
to boost its global image through “vaccine diplomacy,” but inconsistent vaccine
production and a murky middle-man selling vaccines in the developing world
ultimately led to a string of scandals that did Russia’s reputation more harm
than good. What does Russia hope to achieve in 2022? The Moscow Times asked 10
leading experts in Russian foreign policy to give their predictions for the
coming year.
Russia-China relations will
deepen in 2022 Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow and chair of the Russia in
Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center
Two years of the pandemic have
shown the resilience of Russia-China ties. In 2021, trade volume grew to nearly $140
billion, setting another historic record. This figure reflects not only high commodities
prices this year, but also increased shipments of natural gas via the “Power of
Siberia” pipeline and growth in volumes of Russian coal exports to China. In 2022 this trend is likely to continue,
although exact trade volumes will be subject to volatile global prices. As
China shifts away from domestic coal to cleaner fuels like gas, and Russia
seeks to monetize its natural resources, Moscow and Beijing might find more
joint projects. Some of them will be unveiled during Vladimir Putin’s trip to
Beijing in February, with a new contract for the “Power of Siberia 2” gas
pipeline as the crown jewel. The political environment is also benevolent to
the further deepening of China-Russia ties. Moscow’s conflict with the West is
not going away, as demonstrated by recent events in Ukraine, raising the
prospect of more U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia. Beijing’s confrontation
with the U.S. is also here to stay, even if the White House gets distracted by
events in Europe or elsewhere. Despite some predictions, China-Russia entente
is far from its peak, and 2022 is likely to serve as another testament to this.
Keeping the Middle East
“stable in its instability” Mariana
Belenskaya, Middle East correspondent for the Russian daily Kommersant
It seems that Russian foreign
policy is no longer focused on the Middle East, as it was for several years
after the start of the military campaign in Syria. Russia is now moving along a
familiar path — the situation is “stable in its instability” but Moscow has
restored its authority in the region, established ties and assigned roles. The
general task for next year is to increase trade with the countries of the
region — including by expanding the grain market — and maintaining interest in
Russian weapons. Syria, which will remain Russia’s zone of responsibility for
many years to come, is still a separate set of issues. It is important that the
pacified territories do not once again turn into hotbeds of confrontation and
that no global powers initiate new operations in the country. In addition,
Russia hopes that Syria will gradually emerge from its international isolation.
For its part, Moscow will continue trying to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure, at
least to the extent that it can do so alone. Russia might need to pay close attention to
Libya, where it remains unclear how events will develop. Moscow maintains close
contact with all the parties in the Libyan conflict but does not seek a central
role in resolving the problems there — at least for as long as the situation
does not become critical. Two regional problems will require particular
attention next year — the “Iranian nuclear dossier” and Afghanistan. The latter
has become more strongly linked to the Middle East now that Turkey and Qatar
have taken an interest in it. As for Iran, Moscow will do everything in its
power to bring all parties back to the Iran nuclear deal — the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action — as it existed prior to Washington’s withdrawal from it in
2018. Indeed, the answer to the question of whether a Nuclear Deal 2.0 will
appear and how it will look largely depends on how events will transpire in the
Middle East and what role each party in the region will play.
Peace in Ukraine is a victory
in itself Andrei Kortunov, director-general of the Russian International
Affairs Council
It is hard to envisage a
breakthrough or even significant progress in relations between Russia and
Ukraine in 2022. The definition of success would be the ability of the sides to
avoid direct military confrontation in Donbass, in the Azov Sea or along the Russian-Ukrainian
border. The current political dynamic between Kiev and in Moscow is not
conducive to the flexibility needed to move ahead with the implementation of
the Minsk Agreements. At the same time, the change of government in Germany and
the forthcoming presidential election in France make it very hard for the
European members of the Normandy process to exercise the leadership needed to
overcome the current stalemate. One
could expect the Biden administration to become a more active player in the
situation around Ukraine in 2022, but the odds are that White House attention
will be focused on ongoing U.S.-China rivalry and the Ukrainian crisis will
remain a relatively low priority for Washington. Still, de-escalation is
possible, as well as a new Russian-Ukrainian agreement for gas transit. If
these modest goals are achieved in 2022, we might see less hostile and
belligerent rhetoric coming out of Moscow and Kiev.
Further uneasy integration
with Lukashenko in Belarus Artyom Shraibman, Belarussian journalist and
political commentator for the Carnegie Moscow Center
Russia's strategic goals in
Belarus have remained unchanged for many years. Moscow, at minimum, wants to
prevent the rapprochement of Minsk with the West, and at maximum, to strengthen
its own influence in Belarus, which could outlive Alexander Lukashenko. Further institutionalization of such
dependence will be the plan for 2022. This includes promoting bilateral
integration within the Union State, increasing Russian military presence in
Belarus, and “helping” Minsk to reorient its trade flows toward Russia in
response to Western sanctions. Not all of those ambitions will necessarily
materialize, as Lukashenko retains some bargaining power. For several years
now, Moscow has been approaching financial support for Lukashenka
conservatively. The volume of indirect subsidies, discounts on gas and oil and
loans are either decreasing or not growing. The Kremlin gives Lukashenko as
much as is necessary to keep his regime afloat, but the idea of more generous
investment in Belarus has long been unpopular in Moscow. At the same time, one
should not expect Putin to exert tough pressure on Lukashenko in order to speed
up the transfer of power in Belarus. At best, the Kremlin might be ready to
push the friendly regime toward controlled transformation, but Russians will not
actively undermine Lukashenko’s rule. Moscow's
long-standing problem with Belarus is the lack of reliable alternatives to
Lukashenko.
Despite Biden-Putin respect,
Ukraine means a bumpy ride in relations with America Vladimir Frolov,
political columnist and former Russian diplomat
In 2022, the U.S. and Russia will
test the resilience of the respectful adversarial relationship they have
transitioned to after the Geneva summit last June. “The spirit of Geneva” has helped keep
confrontation at an acceptable level through dialogue on strategic stability
and cyber threats and with regular interaction between national security
advisors. The presidential talks
have demonstrated grudging respect and an ability to communicate grievances and
threats clearly, but calmly, while opening new avenues for dialogue. Washington dangles inconclusive talks to
curb Russian unpredictability, while Moscow views engaging with Biden as the
best way to address Russia’s long-ignored concerns without changing course. There is even a rare U.S.-Russia mind-meld
over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran nuclear deal
negotiations, with Iran’s intransigence providing the incentives. Disagreements,
however, will remain. The stand-off over bilateral diplomatic presence has
degenerated into the grotesque, with spy agencies unable to agree on rules for
acceptable espionage activity. Resolving the impasse will require Moscow to
remove its designation of the U.S. as a “hostile power.” Ukraine, NATO enlargement and Russia’s
rightful place in the European security order will remain the key battlegrounds
in 2022. Moscow harbors great expectations after Biden’s promise to
discuss Russia’s concerns over NATO enlargement “among the five major NATO
allies” signaling acceptance of Moscow’s preferred format on European security.
In Ukraine, Russia’s demands have
moved beyond the implementation of the Minsk agreements and are now in
“Finlandization territory.” Moscow’s insistence on legally binding guarantees
of the definitive end to NATO enlargement in the former Soviet Union has
narrowed the scope for face-saving diplomacy. Biden will have a short
time frame in 2022 to negotiate an acceptable accommodation with Putin on
Ukraine and European security. Russia’s posture is unlikely to change before
significant diplomatic progress towards meeting Moscow’s objectives. It will be
a rough ride.
Crucial elections in Latin
America could tilt the balance of power in Russia’s favor Vladimir
Rouvinski, professor at Icesi University in Colombia
In 2021, Russia managed to
position itself as one of the major suppliers of the Covid-19 vaccine to the
region, although mainly supporting countries with friendly relations to Moscow Meanwhile,
key Russia ally President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, not only survived 2021
but also started strengthening his position in the region thanks to a new
left-wing wave on the continent. In the coming year, Russia will be closely
watching several important presidential elections, including Colombia, where a
left-wing candidate is projected to be the likely winner. In Brazil, the very
popular left-wing former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is expected to
announce his bid for the presidency in early 2022. Wins for both left-wing
candidates will dramatically change the Latin American political map and open
new opportunities for Moscow to strengthen its ties in the Western Hemisphere. However, Russia also faces challenges. One of
them is the shortage of tangible resources to support its allies in this part
of the world. This is most evident in Cuba, where the situation is
deteriorating rapidly and Moscow has so far provided minimal aid. The
continuous tensions with Washington over Ukraine may incentivize
reciprocity-driven Russia to pay more attention to Cuba, located just 129
kilometers (80 miles) from the U.S border.
No easy answers in Europe Anton
Barbashin, editorial director of Riddle Russia
It is almost impossible, looking
at the end of 2021, to see a bright future for EU-Russia relations in 2022. The
best case scenario is that they won’t get much worse. We can point to three major themes that will
define this relationship next year — Ukraine, Belarus and the future of gas. In
each of these cases the EU’s goal is to minimize damage, while Russia will
undoubtedly be ready to up the risk-taking, assuming the EU will be the first
to blink. The most heated and potentially most
devastating is the tension over Ukraine and the role of NATO in European
security. While Moscow certainly blames Paris and Berlin for failing to press
Minsk II and is now betting on Washington, it will be the EU that will have to
pick up what’s left after the likely fallout. The blow might be softened by
prompt Nord Stream 2 certification, but as of now it looks like stable gas
prices are not in the basic scenario for 2022. Peaceful or not, 2022 will not be relaxing.
Will the Arctic remain the
sole region of cooperation in 2022? Elizabeth Buchanan, lecturer in
strategic studies with Deakin University at the Australian War College
Will 2022 mark the end of the
Arctic’s “low tension” post-Cold War run or will the Arctic remain “isolated”
from Russian-Western strategic tensions elsewhere? Pundits worldwide will no
doubt keep a watchful eye on any potential spillover from Russia’s current
Ukraine trajectory into the Arctic. Since 2014, Russian-Western ties in the
Arctic have remained largely cooperative, indeed even collaborative via
multilateral vehicles like the Arctic Council. Russia knows that the future economic resource
base of the country does not rest on its Eastern European doorstep, but on its
Arctic frontier. Plunging the Russian Arctic Zone into conflict is therefore
not part of Russia’s strategic playbook. Working to silo the Arctic from
tensions far beyond the region will remain a lynchpin of Kremlin security
planning and outlook. The real geopolitical and strategic gains and
achievements for Moscow in the Arctic will remain nested in Russia’s bilateral
energy engagements. In 2022, I expect an enhanced diversification strategy with
regard to Russia’s economic partners and stakeholders in its various Arctic
energy ventures. Bilateral Arctic ties with India will be central to offsetting
any Russian overreliance on Chinese capital.
Russia will try to gain from
the Taliban’s threat in Central Asia Temur Umarov, research consultant at
Carnegie Moscow Center focusing on Central Asia
In 2022, security concerns in
Afghanistan will continue to be the priority for Moscow in Central Asia. Russia
will see a window of opportunity to regain its reputation — which is being
challenged by China — as the only reliable security guarantor in Central Asia
against the uncertainties that the Taliban regime brings. This
means that in the upcoming year Russia will intensify its cooperation with the
security agencies in Central Asian nations. Russia will also be hoping to push
through its integration projects with countries previously skeptical of
joining. Uzbekistan, for instance, is now seriously considering joining the
Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Overall,
Russia’s leadership will want to see a stable and safe Central Asia in the next
several years. The closer we move toward 2024 presidential elections, the less
energy the Kremlin will have for anything other than its domestic issues. Moscow will therefore try its best to help the
political leaders in Central Asia to become stronger and more stable. However,
this is not going to be an easy task, especially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan.
More than symbolism at the
2022 Russia-Africa Summit Andrey Maslov, head of the Center for African
Studies at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, with researcher for
Intexpertise LLC Sviridov Vsevolod
The volume of Russian-African
trade increased this year for the first time since 2018, diversifying both geographically
and in the range of goods traded. Shipments of railway equipment, fertilizers,
pipes, high-tech equipment and aluminum are growing and work continues on
institutionalizing the interaction between Russia and the African Union. The second Russia-Africa Summit is planned for
2022. In February it will be announced where and when it will be held — most
likely in Russia in November — and in which format. Preparations for the second
summit will shape the Russian-African agenda, visits will become more frequent
and Africa will receive greater coverage in Russian media. Instead of measuring the success of the summit
by how many African leaders attended, as happened in 2019, the parties will
finally give greater attention to the substance of the agenda, which is already
under development. Russia will try to
increase its presence in Africa while avoiding direct confrontation with other
non-regional players. A number of
conflicts are also causing alarm, primarily those in Ethiopia and in Mali, from
which France and the EU are withdrawing their troops. In 2022, Russia will try
in various ways to play a stabilizing role for Africa and assist in confronting
the main challenges it faces — epidemics, the spread of extremism and
conflicts, and hunger. A dialogue will
also begin on Africa formulating its own climate agenda. Africa is beginning to
understand that it does not need a European-style green agenda and will demand
compensation from the main polluting countries for the damage the climatic
changes have caused to the ecosystems of African countries. Russia is likely to
support these demands.
^ Sadly, I think Putin will once
again work to destabilize the world. ^
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/03/foreign-policy-experts-map-russias-plans-for-2022-a75845
